This paper presents new and updated evidence on the efficiency of the EPAD contracts in the Nordic financial electricity market, based on a long sample of 14 years, from 2000 to 2013 inclusive. The Electricity Price Area Differentials (EPADs) are used to hedge against price differences between a bidding area and the Nordic system price. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we estimate the magnitude and significance of ex-post risk premia in EPAD products (season, month, quarter, year) with delivery in 2000-2013. Further, we estimate the relationship between spot and futures prices by vector autoregression (VAR) model. By observing Granger causalities, adjustments to price shocks, and decomposing variance, we aim to shed light on the EPADs' efficiency. Second, we elaborate on some determinants of risk premia and test the roles of time-to-maturity and open interest on risk premia. We additionally consider, for the Nordic system an essential energy source, the role of water availability in the hydro reservoirs on explaining local area price spreads. We support and reject some of the earlier findings about the limited efficiency of the EPADs and bring new empirical evidence on the drivers behind the regional price dynamics.
Introduction
In Europe, the main reason for designing new energy market rules is to facilitate achievement of a well functioning European Internal Energy Market (IEM). This is often referred to as the Target Model for the electricity market and consists of rules governing relevant market time frames. These time frames are covered in the network codes on Electricity Balancing, Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management, and the Forward Capacity Allocation. In this setting the forward capacity allocation code stipulates the rules governing the auctioning of hedging instruments by TSOs enabling hedging of price differences. Financial and physical transmission rights, abbreviated FTR 1 and PTR respectively, are playing an essential role in shaping these market network rules (Rosellón & Kristiansen, 2013) . Some of the key objectives behind introducing tradable transmission rights are promotion of efficiency in cross-border transmission infrastructure, promotion of cross-border competition in generation, mitigation of market power in generation, facilitation of investments in crossborder transmission capacity, risk allocation to TSOs, and accommodation of intermittent generation (Newbery & Strbac, 2011) .
Currently, the European cross-border transmission is allocated by TSOs in a single price coupling algorithm based on marginal pricing principle in the day-ahead implicit auction (ACER, 2011) . Much research has been devoted to Financial Transmission Rights, FTRs, that would result from an implementation of the above mentioned network codes (Buglione, et al. 2009; Füss, Mahringer, & Prokopczuk, 2013; Glachant, 2010; Wobben, 2009 (Buglione, Cervigni, Fumagalli, Fumagalli, & Poletti, 2009 Füss, Mahringer, & Prokopczuk, 2013; Glachant, 2010; Wobben, 2009) , whereas the role of FTRs in the Nordic setting has received much less attention as the Nordic market has an exemption from implementing the FTRs (Hagman & Bjørndalen, 2011; Marckhoff & Wimschulte, 2009 ).
In the Nordic market the EPAD 2 contracts, Electricity Price Area Differential, could fulfil the role of FTRs, i.e. they are used to hedge a basis risk arising from congestion between zones/nodes. There are two main differences between EPADs and FTRs in the current 1 FTR is "a financial contract to hedge source-to-sink (point-to-point) (Rosellón & Kristiansen, 2013) . 2 We refer to EPADs and CfDs interchangeably and treat them equally, depending mainly on the context and historical reference to each term.
congestion and entitles its holder the right -or -obligation -to collect a payment when congestion arises in the energy market"
setting. First, EPADs have no connection to congestion rent collected by TSOs/ISOs during cross-border congestion, whereas FTRs are issued directly by TSOs/ISOs which in this way redistribute the collected congestion rent . Second, FTRs hedge price difference between bidding zones whereas EPADs hedge the price difference between bidding zone and a "reference" system price.
While much theoretical and empirical scrutiny has been devoted to efficiency of wholesale electricity markets (Growitsch & Nepal, 2009; Borenstein, Bushnell, & Wolak, 2002; Joskow, 2006) , the efficiency and determinants of realized risk premia in forward markets remains less charted research area (Redl & Bunn, 2013) . Risk premia are understood as a systematic difference between forward price and the realized delivery date spot price (Shawky, Marathe, & Barrett, 2003) . Therefore, from price efficiency point of view, not only mark-ups in wholesale spot prices are of interest to market participants, but also the role and determinants of risk premia in forwards contracts deserve scrutiny.
An efficient market should not facilitate any significant arbitrage opportunities for strategic market players in a long-run. We aim to test the no-arbitrage condition on the case of Nordic
EPADs by scrutinizing the price discovery process of individual contracts across all traded time horizons (seasonal, monthly, quarterly, yearly) and geographical locations (10 Nordic price zones) during the period 2000-2013. Our work aims to shed light on dynamics and determinants of locational price spreads in the day-ahead auctions, i.e. the difference between area prices and "reference" system price, and the EPAD as the corresponding financial contracts managing this type of risk. The goal is to estimate and explore the dynamic drivers of risk premia in EPADs and evaluate the market's overall efficiency by studying the integration between spot and futures price.
Research background -factors affecting price efficiency
The drivers of different economic outcomes across electricity markets stem from multiple factors, among which are relative production costs, fuel prices, and overall demand. The geographical characteristics of Nordic electricity market, for instance, oblige researchers to account for the dominant role hydro power when considering any market efficiencies.
The impacts of long-term contracts and other vertical arrangements were also shown to lead to performance differences in electricity markets (Bushnell, Mansur, & Saravia, 2008; Christensen, Jensen, & Mollgaard, 2007) . The more specific problem of evaluating efficiency of electricity derivatives market needs to take into account the unique characteristics of electricity 3 where classic arbitrage arguments do not hold for valuation of forwards and futures. This is because electricity contracts are delivered over time based on commodity flows (Wimschulte, 2010; Lucia & Schwartz, 2000) . Yet, studies on efficiency of electricity futures and forward markets differ in conclusions. In the case of Nordic electricity market, Kristiansen (2007) finds inefficient pricing for month, season and year forwards, whereas Wimschulte (2010) finds no significant price differentials between futures portfolios and corresponding forward prices when transaction costs are considered.
Currently, the specific challenges of EPADs in the Nordic electricity market seemingly stem from the lack of sellers and wide price spreads in some price areas 4 . This situation could make it costly for suppliers to enter the market without having a physical production in it (Nasdaq OMX, 2014) . Solutions to these problems are not yet in place, however ENTSO-E's network codes on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management (CACM) and Forward Capacity Allocation (FCA) aim to build transparency via standards for harmonizing the rules across market borders. Among the discussed solutions of managing spatial price risks are auctioning of FTRs/PTRs or EPADs (Johansson & Nilsson, 2011) . The general trend is to enable TSOs auction cross-border hedging products to aid liquidity and transparency hence overall market efficiency 5 .
Liquidity is a factor in forward electricity markets that impacts efficiency by affecting transaction costs, price discovery process, and speed of adjustment to fundamental information. Market participants desire to quickly find trading partners with whom to enter into or exit from contractual positions without adversely affecting asset's price (Sarr & Lybek, 2002, p. 4) . Liquidity is affected, among others, by market design, maturity as well as market concentration (ACER, 2014, p. 14) . Different measures of liquidity in electricity markets exist, such as churn rates or open interest. The churn rate is a ratio between the volume of all trades in all timeframes executed in a given market and its total demand 3 Non-storability, constant balance of supply and demand, , physical interconnection between customer and producer, somewhat limited demand elasticity 4 The market can be characterized as thin but deep in Sarr and Lybek (2002, pp. 5-6) terms. Breadth implies number of participants (thin vs. broad) and depth implies the existence of abundant orders (deep vs. shallow) 5 Growitsch and Nepal (2009) (Nasdaq, 2014) . In addition, bid-ask spread may also be considered as a direct measure of liquidity with more pronounced effects on transaction costs for market participants 7,8. In sum, there are multiple fundamental risk factors affecting supply and demand sides in electricity markets that need to be considered when assessing efficiency of a specific hedging instrument such as EPAD. Next we present our research question, state main objectives and contributions.
Research Question, Objectives, and Contributions
Our key research question is: What constitutes the risk premia in Electricity Price Area
Differentials (EPADs) in the Nordic electricity market?
The underlining objective is to evaluate the efficiency of EPAD contracts in the Nordic electricity market for the period 2000-2013 by 1) studying significance, direction, and magnitude of risk premia according to location, delivery periods, and time-to-maturity, and 2) evaluating the effects of underlying fundamental factors on risk premia (liquidity, time-to-maturity, market size changes, and water availability in the hydro reservoirs). To reveal whether a long-term relationship between expected futures price of EPAD and the realized spot price of EPAD exists we estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) model. This research design enables us to test longterm bi-directional Granger causality between the two price series and their short-term response to price shocks by impulse response functions (IRF). We further decompose the sources of variation in the estimated VAR models and jointly derive conclusions relating to EPADs overall efficiency.
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Our main contribution lies in expanding the limited research on locational price risks in electricity markets and determining their drivers. We bring into the debate a new timeframe 6 It can be understood as a number showing how many times a megawatt hour is traded before it is delivered to the final consumer. Some stakeholders consider a churn rate of at least 3 to be a minimum value. The most liquid market in Europe, Germany, reaches on average a churn of 8.5 7 The bid-ask spread may reflect (Sarr & Lybek, 2002, p. 9) i) order-processing costs; ii) asymmetric information costs; iii) inventory-carrying costs; and iv) oligopolistic market structure costs 8 Other authors, such as Wimschulte (The futures and forward price differential in the Nordic electricity market, 2010, p. 4733) discuss the issue of liquidity between the futures portfolios and forwards. 9 The comparison between the EPAD price and the realized spot price rests on the heroic assumption of perfectly rational expectations, that there are no hidden or private information in the price formation. We do not directly aim to test the efficient market hypothesis but would like to point out to the growing discussion on financial behavior that actually puts this assumption in question. However, we suggest that the methods we use could be a first indication of efficiency in a market. (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) 
Risk management in the Nordic electricity market
Market actors within the electricity market face regular risks of changing input prices and varying demand in space 10 and time. In the future, it may be expected that intermittent power sources will contribute to increased volatility in prices thus to some extent accentuating these risks. In a well-functioning market, financial instruments to hedge risks should spontaneously arise when the values of the risks to market participants exceeds the individual participants preferred risk and opportunity exposure. Typically a producer may wish to lessen the volatility of earnings over time and retailers may want to control input costs, hence a market for an instrument achieving this would emerge. In electricity markets, one interesting feature is the physical connection between generation and final demand. Whenever there is a bottleneck in the system, underlying fundamentals and valuations create a pressure towards geographically differentiated prices (Bohn, Caramanis, & Schweppe, 1984; Stoft, 2002) .
Thus the risks in the electricity market are not only related to the actions of consumers or producers making choices of consumption or production. They also depend on infrastructure's availability and usage which also varies in time and space, depending on market and technical conditions. These temporal and spatial dimensions of the risk of future price development are intimately related to the availability of infrastructure.
In our study of the electricity market we deal with two main types of price risks 11 . First, what is the price going to be in the future (temporal risk)? Second, how often is the congestion going to cause price differences across bidding area borders (spatial risk)? In brief, the current Nordic electricity market handles these risks via two instruments. The future price risk can be managed by taking positions in forwards or futures instruments settled against the system price. The system price is the unconstrained Nordic price and is a price calculated without any congestion in the grid. This price is used for settlement of financial hedging instruments and not directly used in the spot market. The spatial price risk is dealt with by market splitting, i.e. situations when transmission capacity to deficit area is insufficient to equalize the price difference between adjacent areas at time t.
The second price risk can be denoted also as area price risk or basis risk, and is managed by worries that demanding the selling of FTRs would wreak havoc on the market design and in worst case undermine a well-functioning financial market (Hagman & Bjørndalen, 2011) .
This has led to the exemption (ACER, 2011, p. 10) under the condition unless " […] appropriate cross-border financial hedging is offered in liquid financial markets on both side(s) of an interconnector".
Derivative pricing
Due to technical and economic limitations of electricity storability, the traditional theory of storage 14 is not applicable to pricing electricity derivatives. Instead, the price of electricity derivatives is determined by expectations and risk preferences of market participants 15 . Risk premia represent a premium (discount) that buyers (sellers) of futures contracts are willing to pay (accept) in addition to the expected future spot price in order to eliminate the risk of unfavourable future spot price movements (Marckhoff & Wimschulte, 2009, p. 263 
It is a common practice in forward and futures pricing litereatrue (equity, foreign exchange, fixed income derivates) to calculate the ex-ante premium in the forward price as ex-post differential between futures prices and realized delivery date spot prices (Shawky, Marathe, & Barrett, 2003) . Longstaff and Wang (2004) suggested this ex-post approach to risk premia by using as a proxy for ( ), and Marckhoff and Wimschulte (2009) applied this proxy to calculate the ex-post risk premia for EPADs. In our study, we too embrace the ex-post approach to risk premia.
More specifically, during each day of the delivery period, the holder of long EPAD position receives a payoff which is similar to receiving the area spot price and paying the system spot price. sees ex-post risk premia as the difference between average CfD prices and the average difference between area and system price during the delivery period.
Another ex-post approach employed by Marckhoff & Wimschulte (2009) is to examine risk premia on daily basis instead of averaging ex-post premia. The latter approach thus enables assessment of CfD's development throughout the contract's duration. In detail, CfD risk premium at time t for delivery at T = price of CfD contract on time t for delivery at T -the expected price (expected at the present moment t) of CfD contract on time T for delivery at T.
More formally, as Marckhoff and Wimschulte (2009, p. 263 ) specify:
CfD risk premium at time t for delivery at T = CfD price on time t for delivery at T -average realized difference between the area price and the system price during the delivery period between T 1 and T 2 .The premium for each delivery period (year/month/quarter/week) and area is computed separately. For practical purpose/empirical research, the following CfD payoff formula is used:
where is the risk premium;
, -closing price of the CfD contract on day t for delivery in period T;
and -spot area and system prices, respectively, at hour h;
and -start and end of the delivery period, respectively; = duration of the delivery period, in hours.
For an additional overview of empirical studies dealing with spatial price risks in spot and forwards electricity markets, see Table 1 . Quick glance at time frames of the listed studies underlines the scale and scope of our sample (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) which also aims to validate the findings of earlier studies illustrated on shorter time periods. Most CfDs contain significant risk premia (difference between average CfD prices and the average difference between area and system price during delivery); positive premia attributed to risk-averse consumers, whereas negative premia attributed to risk-averse hydro-producers. 
Data
The data used in this study directly originate from Nord Pool Spot (physical market) and Nasdaq OMX Commodities (financial market), and cover years 2000 to 2013. In the Nordic electricity market, congestion between bidding areas is a common feature serving the purpose of signalling scarcity in transmission capacity. The price divergence between reference system price (assumed unrestricted electricity flow across the whole market) and area prices is observable in both daily and hourly frequencies, as shown in Table 2 . Throughout the time and across bidding areas, there is slightly increasing tendency of congestion, where approximately 95 % of days and 90% of hours in a year area prices decouple from the theoretical system price. On the one hand, mean Elspot wholesale system and area prices 17 follow jointly slightly increasing price trend 18 with peaks in 2006, 2008, and 2010 (corresponding to low hydro reservoirs in Norway, Sweden, and Finland, see section 6.1).
On the other hand, the price volatility, measured by standard deviation, is highly locationdependent. Areas with the highest mean volatility are, in the order of magnitude, DK2
Copenhagen, DK1 Århus, and FI Helsinki. Therefore, we would expect to see the highest hedging pressures from producers and retailers in these areas, with correspondingly higher risk premia in absolute terms. In more detail, we observe from Table 3 and Figure 2 that mean absolute and percentage differences between area and system prices are mainly pronounced in the Danish areas, Finland, and Sweden before splitting. Norway 1 is the only area with on average 3% lower price compared to the system price throughout the studied period. The spatial and temporal price variation, caused by local and regional electricity supply and demand conditions, clearly illustrates the need to hedge the locational price risk in the Nordic electricity market. 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate non-significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Values in brackets represent the percentage differences between area prices and system price.
Figure 2 Mean absolute difference (area price -system price), EUR/MWh
Moving from physical (Elspot) to financial (Nasdaq OMXC) market, we assess mean EPAD closing prices according to the contracts' year of delivery/maturity and trading location (see Table 4 ). The signs, magnitude, and dispersion (standard deviation) across areas, years, and contract types point out to the dynamic nature of EPADs. For instance, Oslo (NO1) is the only area with mainly negative mean EPAD prices, which may be explained by large hedging pressure from hydro producers who demand a hedge against price spread especially in wet years. For other areas, EPAD prices are mostly positive, with the highest volatility in Denmark (DK1, DK2) and Finland. We would, ex ante, hold the expectations that areas with large amount of hydro reservoirs show less volatility in prices, thus the expected prices should also be less volatile in e.g. Sweden bidding areas 1-3, and Norway. Reversely, the expected EPAD prices should be higher in Finland, Swedish bidding area 4, Denmark and the Baltic States.
In more detail, we focus on EPAD monthly futures (MF) contracts, which substituted the seasonal contracts in 2004. We synchronize (Shawky, Marathe, & Barrett, 2003 ) the ends of trading periods for MF as well as the respective area price differences (DSPOT) during the delivery period. The summary statistics of the two price series are given in Appendix, Table   12 . Infrequent price spikes cause the series to be leptokurtic, i.e. spiked, and with long right tails, i.e. positively skewed. This is mainly due to limits of economically storing electricity, supply and demand variations, as well as technical capabilities and conditions of the grid.
Both spot and futures prices are not significantly different from zero, and the volatility (std.dev.) of spot price differences is 2 to 6 times higher than volatility of the monthly futures series. 1999; Bunn & Gianfreda, 2010) but at the same time in agreement with others (Dempster, Isaacs, & Smith, 2008; Worthington, Kay-Spratley, & Higgs, 2005) . Unit root statistics are tested on sub-samples in respect to times when individual areas have joined the Nordic market and when the respective monthly contracts started to be traded. See the summary and note in Table 5 . Note: *SE3 refers to Sweden before the area splitting (Nov.2011) and to Stockholm thereafter.
Open interest and risk premia in EPADs
The Next, we examine the risk premia in all traded EPAD products with delivery between 2000 and 2013, calculated according to the formulas in Section 3 (formula 3). Table 6 demonstrates that EPAD contracts contain considerable risk premia which vary in sign and magnitude across contract types, areas, and years. On the one hand, the areas with highest risk premia volatility (standard deviation) are Aarhus (DK1) and Copenhagen (DK2) Helsinki, but Oslo area is slightly different. Oslo has on average lower area price than the system price, and it seems the hydro level deviation tends to impact more strongly the system price than the area price in Oslo. So the producers keep selling EPADs even during the dry years, i.e. expecting the area price will be still lower than the system price. 
Determinants of risk premia in EPADs
The following section sheds more light on the role of hydro reservoirs in explaining the locational price spreads, i.e. area prices minus the system price, which are the building blocks of EPADs in the Nordic electricity market. Further, we evaluate the role of time-to-maturity and risk premia, and test their hypothesized negative relationship.
Role of Hydro
In line with Marckhoff and Wimschulte (2009) , referred to in this section as MW2009 for brevity,, we examine the relationship between the hydropower capacity and the area-system price differential. The hydro reservoir capacity of the country is measured in per cent to the maximum GW capacity but it is the deviation of the current percentage value from the historic median that matters. Given that Sweden was split in four zones from November 1, 2011, we run an extended version of the MW2009 regression, with a structural break dummy: We perform the regression for both Denmark areas, DK1 'Aarhus' and DK2 'Copenhagen', for the Norway area NO1 'Oslo', and for the Finland area 'Helsinki'. We combine the Sweden national price before the splitting and the Stockholm area price after the splitting to obtain the Swedish area price for the whole period, thus we cannot include the structural break dummy in the Swedish regression. The results are presented in Table 7 . The structural break dummy turns out to be insignificant for any price spread and any reservoir level, save the Aarhus area price spread and the Swedish hydropower. The Finnish hydro is not statistically significant in the Aarhus and Oslo regressions (same as in MW2009)
but is significant in the Copenhagen regression (unlike the MW2009).
When compared to a shorter sample in MW2009 for years 2001-6, all the coefficients in our regression, with or without the structural break dummy, appear larger in terms of magnitude.
A larger constant implies a larger price spread on average while larger coefficients imply a stronger response of the price spread to deviations of the hydro level from the median. Our finding provides indirect evidence of higher price variation on the Elspot market; yet examining the roots of such variation is beyond the scope of our paper and so can provide a basis for future research. The regression results are reported in Table 8 , which are broadly similar to those in MW2009. Most equations have a significant and positive constant, in other words, the average risk premium at the expiration date is above zero and statistically significant. Note: The time-to-maturity is cut-off at 60 days for better representation, the full sample has 67 days for DK2, and 122 days for FI and SE3 (6) 
Efficiency of EPADs -vector autoregression (VAR) model
We perform a confirmatory VAR model by which we seek to test theory of efficient pricing signals by investigating the relationship between monthly futures EPAD prices and the corresponding area spot price differences (area price -reference system price) during the contracts' delivery period. We focus on monthly EPAD contracts for two main reasons. First, monthly EPADs provide the highest price variability by being effectively EPADs with the shortest-term delivery period. This fact is also related to, on average, lower forecasting errors of market participants due to the near-term delivery period (Redl & Bunn, 2013) . Second, monthly EPADs belong to the most liquid contract types, what generally implies higher efficiency in transaction costs, price discovery process, and speed of adjustment to fundamental information.
We take the convergence and relationship between spot and forward markets as a measure of efficiency. In an efficient spot and futures markets, we expect to see a bi-directional Granger causality between prices that send proper signals to each other. This means that the area spot price difference, reflecting the local cost of congestion, is properly reflected in the futures EPAD price, which is the expected cost of congestion. Vice versa, the expected cost of congestion priced in the EPAD is properly reflected in the realized spot price difference. To estimate unrestricted VARs for each pair of area spot price differences (DSPOT) and monthly futures (MF) prices, we estimate and test the appropriate lag lengths that make the observed error white noise (Jerko, Mjelde, & Bessle, 2004 Table 13 , and for summary of final models' estimated results, see Table 9 26 . The explanatory power of the estimated models, measured by R 2 , is always higher for the monthly future (MF) series than for the spot price difference series (DSPOT). This is mainly due to much higher volatility (st.dev) and infrequent price spikes (positively skewed and leptokurtic) in spot price differences (DSPOT), which also inflate the standard errors. Nevertheless, we do not know the direction or the magnitude of the causality effects, for which we turn to impulse response functions (IRF) and variance decomposition, respectively.
In general, the IRF figures illustrate (see Appendix, Figure 9 ) a significant positive effect of spot price shocks on EPAD futures for NO1, FI, SE3 (10 days), and with shorter significant duration for DK2 (7 days), DK1 (5 days). The impacts of EPAD futures prices on the spot price differences are also significantly positive, especially pronounced for NO1, DK2, and with fluctuating duration and magnitude for FI, SE3, SE1, SE2, and DK1. The duration of the positive effect in "fluctuating" group seems to last approximately one working week (5 days).
The impulse response function is non-significant for SE4 in both directions, and for NO3 in spot to futures direction. These non-significant relationships were already underlined by the Granger causality test above.
Last, we decompose the variation in the endogenous variables into the component shocks to VAR, i.e. we get a relative measure of how important the shock in spot (futures) price is in explaining the variation in the futures (spot) price at different step-ahead forecasts.
Unsurprisingly we find that the shocks in each price series, spot or futures, are largely explained individually by themselves with limited influence of the second variable. Table 10 summarises the impact (% of variance explained) in one price explained by a shock in another price, 10 days ahead. In combination with IRF, the variance decomposition signifies that spot prices in DK1, NO1, and SE3 respond most strongly to EPAD futures shocks.
Likewise, EPAD prices respond most strongly to spot price shocks in NO1, FI, and SE3. In sum, the estimated VAR models, Granger-causality tests, impulse response functions, and variance decomposition, show bi-directional causality of spot and futures prices, however with limited magnitude and varying durations. The most efficient EPAD markets seem to be located in the price areas with longest trading history (Helsinki, Stockholm, Oslo) which may be a contributing factor in reducing market frictions in the Nordic electricity market. Also EPAD futures and spot market seem to be well integrated in Denmark, especially in Aarhus DK1, where a contributing factor may be a larger hedging demand by retailers and large customers against price volatility due to the large share of fluctuating wind power production in the local power system.
Conclusions
The trigger mechanism for market participants to take position in EPADs is to manage locational price risk. Our ex-post calculation of risk premia revealed their important role in EPAD prices, with varying magnitude and direction across delivery periods, areas, and years.
We explain the negative (positive) risk premia in EPADs by increased hedging pressure from producers (retailers and large customers), which, in turn, are influenced by the actual level of hydro reservoirs, or more precisely the deviation from the historical median, and cross-border transmission capacities. The need to hedge may be different in areas with much hydro capacity (less volatility in prices), with the long-term local price below the system price, and with good connection to neighbouring areas (NO1). Additionally, the hedging need is dependent on the share of fixed price contracts that the end customer have. Local type of production seems to also explain the high volatility and mainly positive risk premia in Danish EPADs, especially in DK1, where significant production originates from wind power.
Having shown the importance of risk premia in EPAD prices, we further tested their theoretical and empirically identified drivers. Our results support the finding that the deviation of the water level in hydro reservoirs from its historical median impacts the local area prices, the system-wide price, as well as the difference of the two prices. (2009) . This provides indirect evidence of higher price variation on the Elspot market, but more studies have to be conducted in order to explore the causalities.
A consistent and significant negative relationship between risk premia and time-to-maturity has been identified for specific area/contract combinations (e.g. Aarhus/year, Copenhagen/season, Malmö/month). For these combinations, the average risk premium at the expiration date is above zero and statistically significant. However, the relationship is not constant and significant for all areas and contracts, and therefore the negative relationship between risk premia and time-to-maturity is supported only partially. Also, the size of the open interest, and hence liquidity, do not seem to correspond, at least at first glance, to the significant relationship between risk premium and the time-to-maturity.
In sum, reasonably conventional econometric tests support the overall efficiency of the Nordic EPAD market. Our findings indicate that market maturity may be the main driver as efficiency seem to increase with longer trading history. Illustrated on EPAD monthly contracts, we showed that EPADs futures prices and the realized spot price difference during their delivery period are reasonably integrated, thus efficient. Some limitations were found in Malmö SE4 area, which may be due to market's relative immaturity, but future research should investigate the causes in further detail.
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